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STATE OP NEW YORK 
") PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 3, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3996 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 
Intervenor. 
NORMAN ROTHFELD, Esq., for Petitioner 
DAVID BASS, Esq. (JERRY ROTHMAN of counsel), for Employer 
ROBERT PEREZ-WILSON, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARY O'CONNELL of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Local 3, 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO 
(petitioner) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing its petition 
to represent certain unrepresented computer service technicians 
and supervising computer service technicians employed by the 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New 
York (employer). The employer and District Council 37, American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (intervenor) 
opposed the petition on the ground that the at-issue employees 
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were most appropriately placed in the intervener's existing 
bargaining unit, which includes certain computer titles. The 
Director added the unrepresented positions to the intervener's 
unit because of the shared community of interest between them and 
the computer titles in the intervenor's unit and to avoid a 
further proliferation of bargaining units of the employer's 
employees.-7 
The petitioner excepts to the Director's decision on the 
grounds that the at-issue titles do not share a community of 
interest with the employees in the intervener's unit, that the 
Director made certain factual errors, and that the assigned 
Administrative Law Judge (AKJ) committed errors in his conduct of 
the hearing.-7 The intervenor supports the Director's decision. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of 
the Director. 
The employer employs ten to twenty employees as computer 
service technicians or supervising computer service technicians 
There are approximately 40 bargaining units. 
The conduct and ruling by the ALJ which the petitioner 
complains about is raised for the first time in its 
exceptions. Since the conduct and ruling complained of 
occurred at the hearing in this matter, the petitioner 
should have raised objection on the record (Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) §201.9(d)), could have made a motion to 
the ALJ to have him recuse himself (Rules of Procedure, 
§201.9(c)(3)), or could have objected to the Director. As 
the petitioner never raised any objection until in its 
exceptions, despite numerous opportunities to do so, we will 
not address this exception, there not being any 
extraordinary circumstances which would permit us to reach 
it. 
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in its Office of Technical Services, which is part of the 
Division of Computer Information Services (DCIS). There are two 
repair centers in Queens, two in Brooklyn and one each in the 
Bronx, Staten Island and Manhattan. The technicians maintain and 
repair the employer's computers in either these centers or, on 
occasion, at one of the schools. They may also supervise other 
personnel in routine maintenance of the computers. They are 
involved in some on-going projects, such as Automate the Schools, 
which is designed to link the local area networks at the 
employer's schools with its mainframe computer at its Metrotech 
Plaza in Brooklyn. In this project and in some repair work, the 
computer service technicians and the supervising computer service 
technicians interact with various other employees represented by 
the intervenor in computer and telecommunications titles. 
The intervener's unit consists of approximately 6,500 of the 
employer's employees, in the areas of computer personnel, 
accountants, statisticians, clerical and administrative, general 
service, motor vehicle and supervising clerical. Approximately 
250 employees work in computer titles and are located in the 
DCIS. Additionally, the intervenor also represents the computer 
service technicians and supervising computer service technicians 
employed by the various mayoral and nonmayoral agencies of the 
City of New York (City). For titles common to both the City and 
the employer, economic bargaining is conducted between the City 
and a coalition of unions, led by the intervenor. The resulting 
salary agreement is adopted by the employer. The employer then 
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negotiates with the intervenor for an agreement which covers 
other terms and conditions of employment for the employees 
represented by the intervenor, including, inter alia, workday and 
workweek, holidays, overtime, health insurance, safety and 
grievance procedures. The last collective bargaining agreement 
expired in 1989 and the intervenor and the employer have 
continued negotiations for a successor agreement. 
The technician titles are in the competitive class of the 
Civil Service and have an annual salary of approximately $24,000 
for the computer service technicians and approximately $38,000 
for the supervising computer service technicians. The computer 
and telecommunications titles represented by the intervenor are 
also in the competitive class of the Civil Service and have a 
salary range of $26,00 to $50,000. 
The employer opposes the creation of an additional 
bargaining unit as sought by the petitioner because of the 
increased administrative burden on its staff that presently . 
negotiates and administers forty collective bargaining agreements 
with the representatives of the employer's other employees. 
The petitioner argues that the Director erred in including 
"skilled trade" employees in a unit of other employees and in 
"accreting" titles that were not in the unit from its inception. 
The petitioner also argues that there is no community of interest 
and no interaction between the petitioned-for employees and the 
employees represented by the intervenor, and that the intervenor 
should be estopped from representing these employees because it 
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refused to represent them at one time. Finally, the petitioner 
asserts that the Director erred in finding that another unit of 
employees would not be compatible with the employer's 
responsibilities to serve the public. 
We have long held that in the creation of bargaining units, 
it is the most appropriate unit, not an appropriate unit, which 
must be established.-7 We have also consistently favored the 
creation of the largest possible unit which permits for effective 
and meaningful negotiations and which will avoid a proliferation 
of bargaining units.-7 Finally, the administrative convenience 
of the employer and its ability to meet its responsibility to 
serve the public is a factor to be considered in determining the 
most appropriate unit.-7 
The record establishes a clear community of interest between 
the computer service technicians, the supervising computer 
service technicians and the employees in the unit represented by 
the intervenor. They share the same basic mission: the 
establishment, maintenance and further development of the 
employer's computer and telecommunications system. They are 
employed in the same division, under the same general 
supervision, with similar terms and conditions of employment and 
57
 State of New York, 1 PERB 5399.85 (1968), aff'd sub nom. 
CSEA V. Helsbv, 32 A.D.2d 131, 2 PERB 57007 (3d Dep't 1969), 
aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 842, 2 PERB j[7013 (1969). 
y Onondaaa-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 23 PERB 53014 (1990). 
^ Act, §207.1(c); Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the 
City of Buffalo, 14 PERB 53051 (1981). 
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they frequently interact in the performance of their assignments 
in the schools. Any occupational differences which may arise, 
and the petitioner points to none, are far outweighed by these 
similarities; indeed, the petitioner presented no evidence of any 
actual or potential conflict of interest. 
The employer opposes the creation of another unit of 
employees, arguing against the establishment of a forty-first 
unit of ten to twenty employees. The employer's position here is 
consistent with the policies of the Act and our prior decisions, 
where we weigh the employer's ability to provide service to the 
public against the creation of another bargaining unit. Such an 
analysis "takes into consideration the administrative convenience 
of the employer and perhaps suggests that an excessive number of 
units might be undesirable"-7, as the Director here concluded. 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Director's 
decision. The computer service technician and the supervising 
computer service technician are most appropriately placed in the 
unit represented by the intervenor. Since the continuing 
majority status of the intervenor will not be affected by the 
addition of these employees to its unit of approximately 6,500 
employees, no election is necessary.-7 
Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of 
Buffalo, supra at 3083. 
New York Convention Center Operating Corp., 27 PERB 53034 
(1994) . 
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It is therefore ordered that the petitioner's exceptions are 
dismissed and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
DATED: November 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
l^ irie R. Ki nsell a . Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. E isenberg, Member / 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WATERFORD TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13859 
WATERFORD-HALFMOON UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (J. CHRISTOPHER MEAGHER and 
MITCHELL H. RUBINSTEIN of counsel), for Charging Party 
BUCHYN, O'HARE, WERNER & GALLO (KATHRYN McCARY of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) on an improper practice charge filed by the Waterford 
Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) against 
the Waterford-Halfmoon Union Free School District (District). 
The Association alleges in its charge that the District 
discontinued the salary terms of the parties' expired collective 
bargaining agreement in violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, after expiration, on 
August 31, 1992, of the parties' 1989-92 agreement, it did not 
compute a new salary schedule for the 1992-93 school year and 
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In the Matter of 
WATERFORD TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
APT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13859 
WATERFORD-HALFMOON UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (J. CHRISTOPHER MEAGHER and 
MITCHELL H. RUBINSTEIN of counsel), for Charging Party 
BUCHYN, O'HARE, WERNER & GALLO (KATHRYN McCARY Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) on an improper practice charge filed by the Waterford 
Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) against 
the Waterford-Halfmoon Union Free School District (District). 
The Association alleges in its charge that the District 
discontinued the salary terms of the parties' expired collective 
bargaining agreement in violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, after expiration, on 
August 31, 1992, of the parties' 1989-92 agreement, it did not 
compute a new salary schedule for the 1992-93 school year and 
A 
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when it did not pay eligible unit employees annual service 
increments provided by the 1991-92 salary schedule. 
The Director dismissed the charge on the ground that the 
salary provisions of the parties' agreement were "internally 
sunsetted"-7 and, therefore, were limited to the duration of the 
parties' 1989-92 contract. The Director accordingly held that 
the District did not violate §209-a.l(e) of the Act when it paid 
unit employees in 1992-93 the same salaries they had been paid in 
the preceding school year. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the terms of a 
contract cannot be sunsetted lawfully, that sunset agreements, if 
permissible, must be manifested by plain and clear language 
evidencing a waiver of rights under §209-a.l(e) of the Act and, 
notwithstanding the above, that there is no evidence establishing 
the parties' intent to sunset the salary provisions of the 
expired agreement. The District disagrees with the Association's 
arguments regarding sunset agreements and argues that the 
Director was correct in holding that the salary agreements 
sunsetted upon expiration of the 1989-92 contract. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, including those at oral argument, we affirm the 
> 
Director's decision insofar as he held that the District was not 
-
7A sunset provision, in relevant respect, is an agreement 
between the parties to a bargaining relationship under which one 
or more terms of a collective agreement are terminated at a 
specified time, typically upon expiration of the contract, or 
upon a specified condition. 
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required to compute new salary schedules for 1992-93, or 
thereafter, but reverse insofar as the Director held that the 
District did not have an obligation to advance unit employees on 
step in accordance with the 1991-92 salary schedule. 
Initially, we address each of the Association's first 
two basic legal arguments concerning the nature and limits of 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
Section 209-a.l(e) of the Act requires an employer to 
continue all of the terms of an expired collective agreement 
pending negotiation of a successor agreement unless the union 
which represents the employer's employees violates the no-strike 
provisions of the Act. However, nothing in §209-a.l(e) restricts 
what the terms of those collective agreements may be or directs 
what they must be and nothing therein limits the parties' power 
and right to define the terms of their own agreement. If the 
parties to a bargaining relationship want to restrict the 
duration of a contract term, or to otherwise condition the 
continuation of that contract provision, they are free to do so 
as a matter of law and policy. Nothing in the many cases cited 
by the Association or in the legislative history of §209-a.l(e) 
of the Act compels or warrants a contrary conclusion. We 
conclude, therefore, that parties may sunset a given term in 
their collective bargaining agreement. 
The Association's second basic argument is that the 
sunsetting of a term of an agreement, if permissible, must be 
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made manifest by plain and clear language evidencing an 
intentional relinquishment of rights because a sunset 
represents a waiver of the protections of §209-a.l(e). This 
argument proceeds, however, from a mistaken premise because a 
sunset agreement is simply not a waiver of §209-a.l(e). 
Section 209-a.l(e) of the Act continues the terms of an expired 
agreement, but only as those terms were negotiated by the 
parties. If the parties have agreed, for example, that a term of 
their agreement will end upon expiration of the contract, the 
employer's discontinuation of that term upon expiration of the 
contract is entirely consistent with §209-a.l(e), if not 
compelled by it. In that circumstance, §209-a.l(e) has not been 
waived; it never attached in a manner to require the continuation 
of a term of an expired agreement which the parties agreed to 
terminate at the end of the contract. To hold otherwise, and 
require the post-expiration continuation of a term of a contract 
which has ended by agreement upon expiration of that contract, 
would change the terms of the parties7 agreement. 
It is, therefore, the nature of the parties' specific 
agreement as to a given term of their contract which determines 
the employer's post-expiration obligations with respect to that 
term under §209-a.l(e) of the Act. In ascertaining the nature of 
the parties' agreement, the character of the evidence necessary 
to establish an agreement to a term of a contract for purposes of 
§209-a.l(e) is no different than the character of the evidence 
necessary to establish an agreement to any other term of an 
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agreement for any other purpose under the Act. The mutual assent 
essential to the formation of an agreement can be established by 
evidence short of that which would establish a waiver of 
statutory rights. As with any agreement, a sunset agreement can 
exist in any circumstance in which it can be concluded reasonably 
that the parties intended to restrict or condition a given term 
of their collective bargaining agreement. It is in this context 
which we assess the propriety of the District's conduct. 
Article V of the parties' 1989-92 contract covers salaries. 
That provision of the parties' contract calls for the creation of 
salary schedules according to a formula for the three years 
covered by the agreement. Each salary schedule was to have 20 
steps which corresponded to years of service. Steps 1, 5, 10, 15 
and 2 0 were to be computed according to the mean of salaries in 
the contracts of certain specified school districts which had 
been ratified on or before January 30 of the years 1989, 1990 and 
1991. All other steps on the salary schedule were to be the 
average difference between each of the meaned steps. The salary 
schedule for 1989-90 was appended to the parties' 1989-92 
contract; the schedules for 1990-91 and 1991-92 were created 
thereafter using the formula in Article V. 
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This case is consistent with the analysis in Cobleskill 
Central School District-7 (hereafter Cobleskill). Under 
Cobleskill, a salary schedule is not merely a device for the 
identification of a given employee's salary during the life of an 
agreement. A salary schedule reflects simultaneously both an 
individual's rate of pay for a given year and a wage system. The 
individual's rate of pay is represented by the dollar amounts 
assigned for a given year to each step of the schedule. The wage 
system exists in the calculation of wage rates based upon 
component factors. In Cobleskill, the component factors of that 
salary system were education and years of service; here, the 
component factor of the wage system is years of service only. 
The particular factors in a wage system may vary by employer, but 
it is the wage system in whatever its form which is the term of 
the agreement subject to continuation. 
In examining Article V, we agree with the Director's 
conclusion that the parties did not intend the District to be 
under a continuing obligation after expiration of the 1989-92 
contract to refashion new salary schedules for years other than 
those covered by the agreement. The refashioning of those 
schedules could change, at most, only the dollar amounts assigned 
to the step schedule. It is apparent to us that the parties in 
this case intended the rates of pay assigned to any given step to 
^16 PERB H3057 (1983), aff'd, 105 A.D.2d 564, 17 PERB -57019 (3d 
Dep't 1984), motion for leave to appeal denied, 64 N.Y. 2d 610, 
1071, 18 PERB 57006 (1985). 
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change only during the three years of their agreement. This 
aspect of the parties' salary schedule is properly viewed no 
differently than if they had agreed, for example, to fixed 
percentage salary or flat wage increases for each of the years 
covered by their contract. Upon expiration of the contract, the 
unit employees would not be entitled under §209-a.l(e) to 
additional annual percentage or flat increases in base pay until 
a new agreement was negotiated because it would be manifest in 
that circumstance that the salary or wage increases were intended 
to be granted during the term of the agreement only. Here, too, 
the parties effected wage increases for unit employees 
formulaically for the years covered by their contract. The 
salary schedules for each of three specified school years were to 
be based on data from surrounding districts as of the prior 
January 30, e.g., January 30, 1991 for the 1991-92 salary 
schedule. It is not reasonable to conclude from this language 
that these parties intended to have the District create a 
schedule for 1992-93 from January 30, 1992 data or from the data 
from any preceding or subsequent year for that matter. A fair 
reading of Article V leads us to the conclusion that the 
District's obligation to fashion new salary schedules was limited 
to the duration of the 1989-92 contract, that that obligation was 
satisfied by its fashioning of the three salary schedules and 
that it owed the Association no duty under §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
to create a new salary schedule for 1992-93, or any school year 
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thereafter, until the parties reached a new agreement imposing 
that obligation. 
This leaves for consideration the separate issue of whether 
the District was required to advance unit employees on the steps 
under the 1991-92 salary schedule. Cobleskill controls the 
analysis of this issue as well. In that case, the Board held 
that the employer was obligated to make service advancements on a 
salary schedule contained in an expired agreement. In reaching 
that conclusion, the Board rejected the employer's argument that 
a reference to the years the salary schedules covered sunsetted 
the wage system represented by the two component parts of those 
salary schedules. Relying on the Board's decision in Suffolk 
County,-f the Director reached a contrary conclusion in this 
case. In Suffolk County, a reference to salaries being 
determined for "the four academic years covered by this 
agreement" was held to have sunsetted the employer's obligation 
to pay service increments after expiration of the contract. 
Having reexamined Suffolk County and Cobleskill, we conclude 
that Suffolk County is not reasonably distinguishable from 
Cobleskill, and to the extent Suffolk County is inconsistent with 
Cobleskill, we reverse Suffolk County. In Cobleskill. we held 
that the reference to the years covered by the salary schedules 
5/18 PERB H3030 (1985), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Faculty 
Ass'n of Suffolk Community College v. PERB, 18 PERB HI7016 (Sup. 
Ct. Suffolk Co. 1985), aff'd, 125 A.D.2d 307, 20 PERB f7002 (2d 
Dep't 1986). 
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was most reasonably viewed as a reference to the dollar amounts 
associated with the several service and education steps. That is 
the most reasonable construction of such a reference in the 
context of a salary schedule absent evidence of a mutual intent 
to also abolish or sunset the salary system itself. We cannot 
conclude that a simple reference to the years covered by salary 
schedules reflects an intent to terminate the wage system 
embodied therein without similarly concluding that a contract's 
general duration clause serves to sunset all of the terms of the 
contract upon expiration. The former is merely a more 
particularized version of the latter and to have a contract's 
duration clause sunset all terms of that contract obviously 
defeats the very purpose of §209-a.l(e) of the Act. Moreover, 
the abolition of a wage system upon expiration of a contract 
leaves no methodology for the calculation and payment of wages, 
certainly as to new hires. Such a change in the terms of the 
parties' last agreement cannot be assumed. 
The District argues, however, that it had no statutory 
obligation to advance teachers from one step to another on any 
salary schedule in the absence of a new, recomputed schedule. 
But this argument entirely ignores that service steps in a salary 
schedule such as the District's, as in Cobleskill, are a 
component part of a wage system and it is the wage system which 
must be maintained upon expiration of the collective agreement. 
The parties admittedly did not discuss the consequences of an 
expired agreement generally or the effect of the contract's 
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expiration on the parties' salary agreement. There being nothing 
in this record to establish that the parties intended that upon 
expiration of the 1989-92 contract their agreement to a service-
based system of compensation would expire, the District was 
required under §209-a.l(e) of the Act to advance unit employees 
one step annually on the 1991-92 salary schedule and to pay them 
at the rate specified on that schedule. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District violated 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act by not advancing unit employees on the 
steps set forth in the 1991-92 salary schedule and by not paying 
unit employees at the rate specified for those steps. The charge 
is dismissed in all other respects. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Advance unit employees annually, commencing with the 
1992-93 school year, on the steps set forth in the 
1991-92 salary schedule and pay to each unit employee 
so advanced the difference between the salary actually 
paid to such employee and the salary that would have 
been paid to the employee had the employee been 
advanced on the 1991-92 salary schedule in accordance 
with this decision, such advances and payments to 
continue until such time as a successor to the 1989-92 
agreement is negotiated, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
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2. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all 
locations normally used to post notices of information 
to unit employees. 
DATED: November 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
j ^Jyo i J^C«*cef\ 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
NOTICE TO AIL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees in the unit represented by Waterford Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO that the 
Waterford-Halfmoon Union Free School District will: 
Advance unit employees annually, commencing with the 1992-93 school year, on the steps set forth in the 1991-92 
salary schedule and pay to each unit employee so advanced the difference between the salary actually paid to such 
employee and the salary that would have been paid to the employee had the employee been advanced on the 1991-
92 salary schedule in accordance with the PERB decision, such advances and payments to continue until such time 
as a successor to the 1989-92 agreement is negotiated, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Waterford Halfmoon UFSD 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
hy any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORANGE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-42 68 
COUNTY OF ORANGE and SHERIFF OF ORANGE 
COUNTY, 
Joint Employer, 
-and-
ORANGE COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
KENNETH J. FRANZBLAU, ESQ., for Petitioner 
KAUFF, MCCLAIN & McGUIRE (HARLAN J. SILVERSTEIN of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Orange 
County Deputy Sheriff's Association, Inc. (Association) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). The Association filed a petition on 
May 5, 1994, seeking to represent a unit of certain employees, 
jointly employed by the County of Orange and the Sheriff of 
Orange County (County/Sheriff), who are currently represented by 
the Orange County Correction Officers Benevolent Association 
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(COBA).-' The Director dismissed the Association's petition as 
untimely. He held that a collective bargaining agreement between 
the County/Sheriff and COBA, which expires December 31, 1995, 
barred the Association's petition. Although this contract, which 
was executed on May 14, 1993, provides retroactive wage increases 
for unit employees for 1990, 1991 and 1992, the Director held 
that the contract was of three-years7 duration, covering only 
calendar years 1993, 1994 and 1995. On that interpretation, a 
petition would not be timely under §201.3(d) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) until May 1995, the month preceding expiration 
of COBA's period of unchallenged representation status under 
§208.2 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Alternatively, the Director determined that even if the contract 
were held to be of six years7 duration, it should be treated as 
two successive three-year agreements for purposes of assessing 
the timeliness of the Association's petition. This alternative 
interpretation also permits a petition to be filed by the 
Association in May 1995, but not May 1994, when the Association 
filed its petition. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the contract 
between the County/Sheriff and COBA must be held to be a six-year 
agreement because its wage terms cover that period of time. It 
also argues that the Director's alternative basis for dismissal 
-'COBA was certified by us on August 25, 1992, pursuant to a 
petition it filed in May 1991, replacing the Association as the 
bargaining agent for this unit. 
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of its petition constitutes rule-making, which can only be done 
in accordance with the procedures in the State Administrative 
Procedure Act. COBA argues in response that the Director was 
correct in both of his constructions of its contract with the 
County/Sheriff and in dismissing the Association's petition as 
untimely. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Director's 
dismissal of the petition. 
In dismissing the Association's petition as untimely, we do 
not agree with the Director's conclusion that the agreement 
between COBA and the County/Sheriff is of three years' duration. 
In reaching his conclusion in this respect, the Director deferred 
completely to the parties' intent as to the contract's duration 
as expressed in the contract's duration clause. Although 
recognizing the duration of the wage terms of the parties' 
agreement, the Director concluded that holding the contract to be 
of six-years duration would necessarily make all contracts 
retroactive anytime the parties to those contracts were to 
correct any error which may have been made before the contracts 
were executed. However, we consider there to be a clear 
difference between the ministerial correction of an error, which 
might not affect the duration of a contract, and the deliberate 
negotiation of a major term of a collective bargaining agreement. 
In this case, the last agreement for this unit expired in 
December 1989. The agreement expiring December 31, 1995 provides 
for retroactive wage increases for 1990, 1991 and 1992. Parties 
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to a negotiating relationship are unable by merely labeling their 
agreement as being of a certain duration to cause us to disregard 
the reality of their collective bargain. The reality of the 
bargain in this case is that the County/Sheriff and COBA reached 
an agreement in May 1993, within one year of COBA's 
certification, which was prospective to December 31, 1995 and 
retroactive in major respect to January 1, 1990, a date 
coincident with the expiration of the last agreement covering 
this unit. 
Having concluded that COBA and the County/Sheriff have a 
contract of six years' duration leaves for decision the question 
of how that agreement is to be interpreted for purposes of 
assessing the timeliness of the Association's May 1994 petition. 
The Association argues that its petition must be timely 
because §208.2(b) of the Act provides that an agreement "having a 
term in excess of three years shall be treated as an agreement 
for a term of three years . . . ." It argues that the contract 
between COBA and the County/Sheriff must be deemed to have 
expired under §208.2(b) of the Act on December 31, 1992, making 
its petition timely under §201.3(e) of our Rules, which allows 
petitions to be filed 12 0 days after expiration of a collective 
agreement. 
The conclusion advanced by the Association is exactly the 
one the Board rejected in Kenmore-Town of Tonawanda Union Free 
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School District.-f In that case, the Board held that a six-year 
agreement is to be treated as two, three-year agreements for 
contract bar purposes. The decision in that case, and ours here, 
represent an interpretation and application of §208.2 of the Act. 
They do not, as argued by the Association, in any way constitute 
rule-making. Therefore, the State Administrative Procedure Act 
has no application. 
We believe that Kenmore-Town of Tonawanda Union Free School 
District reasonably balances the Act's purposes to promote 
stability in labor relations and the employees' right to 
periodically reassess their selection of a bargaining agent. On 
this interpretation, the Association is afforded two 
opportunities during the term of the contract between the 
County/Sheriff and COBA to seek the representation of unit 
employees. Whether that decision is applicable in all 
circumstances involving multi-year agreements need not be 
decided. We hold only that in the circumstances presented here, 
the Director was correct in concluding, under Kenmore-Town of 
Tonawanda Union Free School District, that the next available 
filing period under the agreement between COBA and the 
County/Sheriff is May 1995. 
We would reach the same result on an alternative 
interpretation of §208.2(b) of the Act. A main purpose of that 
section of the Act is to preclude the parties to a negotiating 
2/12 PERB 53055 (1979), aff'q 11 PERB f4569 (1978). 
Board - C-4268 -6 
relationship from preventing challenges to the majority status of 
the incumbent union for an unreasonable period of time. 
Section 208.2(b), therefore, guarantees one period for 
representation challenge at least every three years. From 120 
days after expiration of a contract between a public employer and 
an employee organization until those parties negotiate a new 
agreement, however, an incumbent union's majority status is at 
all times challengeable by representation petition filed under 
§201.3(e) of the Rules by either public employees or another 
employee organization. If the "term" of the agreement in 
§208.2(b) were to be read to include the period of a contract's 
retroactivity, it would often open the incumbent employee 
organization to challenge immediately upon the conclusion of 
collective negotiations, for it is often the case that successor 
agreements are not reached until long after expiration of the 
prior agreement. As such, the reference to the "term" of the 
agreement in §208.2(b) is most reasonably read to mean the 
prospective term of the agreement, excluding any period of 
retroactivity. The Legislature's intent to establish a balance 
between the stability of bargaining relationships and the right 
of employees to choose their bargaining agent is thus preserved. 
The contrary interpretation of §208.2(b) advanced by the 
Association is destructive of the stability in labor relations 
which §208.2(b) of the Act intends to promote and is unnecessary 
to preserve to employees a reasonable opportunity to reassess 
their selection of a bargaining agent. Moreover, the 
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Association's interpretation produces illogical results. The 
Association would have us interpret §2 08.2(b) of the Act in a way 
which would permit it to file a petition questioning COBA's 
majority status at any time on and after May 1992, even though 
COBA was not certified until August 1992. The facts of this 
particular case, therefore, clearly demonstrate why the 
calculation of the filing periods for representation petitions in 
relevant context can only reasonably be made based upon the 
prospective term of a collective bargaining agreement. The 
prospective term of the agreement between the County/Sheriff and 
COBA is less than three years and, as calculated by reference to 
that term, the next available representation filing period is May 
1995. 
The Association's petition is, therefore, untimely under 
either analysis and the Director properly dismissed it. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
PauVine R. KinselleK, Chairperson 
Walter_J*. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROY B. REYNOLDS, et al., 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-1547 6 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
ROY B. REYNOLDS, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Roy B. Reynolds 
to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing his charge that the State of 
New York (Department of Social Services) (State) violated 
§209-a.l(b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). He alleges that the State, in February 1994, after the 
issuance of a decision by the Director adding him and ten other 
physicians to a unit of State employees,-7 reduced certain 
benefits which they had previously received as unrepresented 
employees to the level provided for in the contract covering the 
negotiating unit into which they were placed. Reynolds further 
17See State of New York, 26 PERB [^4063 (1993) . 
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alleges that other physicians in the same title who were not 
placed in the unit continue to receive the higher benefits. 
Reynolds was then informed by the Assistant Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant 
Director) that the charge was deficient as the allegations did 
not constitute a violation of the Act. On May 9, 1994, he filed 
an amendment to the charge asserting that the State's conduct 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act because it was in 
retaliation for the physicians becoming represented employees. 
The Director thereafter dismissed the charge, holding that there 
were no facts evidencing any improper motivation. 
Reynolds asserts in his exceptions that unrepresented 
employees who are added to a bargaining unit cannot have their 
benefits reduced, that it is a violation of the Act for 
represented employees to receive a level of benefits different 
from unrepresented employees in the same title, and that the 
Director was biased in deciding this case because he also decided 
the earlier representation matter. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Director's 
decision. 
Reynolds does not here challenge his unit placement, nor 
could he in the context of this improper practice charge. He 
only questions the legality of an employer having different 
benefit levels as between represented and unrepresented 
employees. The Act does not regulate nor govern benefits or 
relationships between an employer and unrepresented employees. 
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The employer is, therefore, under no statutory obligation to 
conform the terms and conditions of unrepresented employees to 
those of represented employees. That some nonunit employees in 
the same or similar titles might enjoy a different salary 
schedule or level of benefits does not, in and of itself, violate 
the Act.2/ 
Finally, we conclude that the Director was not precluded 
from deciding the instant matter. Our Rules of Procedure (Rules) 
require the Director to review each charge initially to determine 
if the facts as alleged may constitute a violation of the Act.-7 
To accept the charging party's argument that once the Director 
has decided a representation matter, as he is also required by 
our Rules to do,-7 he may not decide a subsequent improper 
practice charge involving the same unit, would preclude the 
Director from fulfilling the obligations imposed upon him by our 
Rules. There being no evidence of bias in fact, there is no 
ground for the Director's recusal or disqualification. 
The exceptions are, therefore, dismissed and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
2/New York Citv Transit Auth. . 26 PERB J[3081 (1993) 
5/Rules, §204.2. 
^Rules, Part 2 01. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
iv 
PauMne R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter^Jk. Eisenberg, Member / 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
2E-11 /30 /94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RAYMOND R. SWANNO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-335 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION), 
Employer, 
-and-
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Intervenor. 
RAYMOND R. SWANNO, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Raymond R. Swanno excepts to a decision by the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing a petition he filed seeking the placement of his 
position-7 with the State of New York (Department of Education) 
(State) into a unit of employees which is currently represented 
by the Public Employees Federation (PEF). The Director dismissed 
the petition because §201.2(b) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) 
does not permit individuals to file unit placement petitions. 
The Director noted, moreover, that Swanno7s position is also 
^Swanno has been designated managerial or confidential in his 
title of Associate Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor. 
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neither newly created nor substantially altered, as §201.2(b) of 
the Rules requires. 
In his exceptions, Swanno essentially argues that the 
Director's dismissal of his petition was unfair because he could 
not present arguments regarding his employment status and the 
appropriateness of his uniting within PEF. Our Rules, however, 
specifically and intentionally do not permit an employee to file 
a unit placement petition. Unit placement questions may be 
raised by either a union or an employer only. The Director's 
decision, therefore, is affirmed for the reasons stated therein. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
</lJU-l lLk\l\<A ^
 
PauLme R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric Schmertz, Member 
2F-11 /30 /94 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
6EOR6INE ASSANTE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15529 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
and UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
6E0RGINE ASSANTE, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Georgine 
Assante to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing her charge 
that the City School District of the City of New York (District) 
and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) violated, 
respectively, §209-a.l(a) and (d) and §209-a.2(b) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Assante alleges 
that, in 1990, the District had her improperly physically 
restrained and confined, that thereafter she was improperly 
examined by District doctors and that, despite repeated requests, 
she had been unable to obtain from the District copies of certain 
medical reports and records relating to these events. She 
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further alleges that, in 1990, UFT denied her representation and 
denied her an explanation of her rights.-7 
Assante was informed by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) that 
her charge was deficient because she had no standing to allege 
violations of §209-a.l(d) or §209-a.2(b) of the Act, the acts 
complained of occurred more than four months prior to the filing 
of the charge and were, therefore, untimely,-7 and that 
insufficient facts were pled with respect to the §2 09-a.l(a) and 
§209-a.2(c) allegations. Assante thereafter filed an unsworn 
amendment alleging that she had been in touch with the District 
and UFT on a regular basis during the four-month period 
immediately preceding the filing of the charge. The Assistant 
Director informed Assante that the amendment could not be 
accepted because it was not sworn to and that her charge could 
not be processed until she submitted facts in support of her 
allegations. 
Assante filed a second, notarized amendment, again with 
general allegations of misconduct by the District and UFT. Her 
allegations against the District still centered on its reliance 
on certain medical reports and its refusal to release medical 
records to her, pursuant to requests she had made after the 
charge was filed. Her allegations against UFT remained 
17Assante also alleges that she was not given adequate 
representation during a grievance hearing in 1992. 
^Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.1(a). 
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generalized, complaining of bad faith in its representation of 
her. 
The Director then dismissed the charge for lack of standing 
to allege §209-a.l(d) and §209-a.2(b) violations, as untimely 
with respect to some of the allegations, and for failing to 
provide supporting facts for her remaining allegations. 
Assante's exceptions repeat the allegations in her charge 
and amendments and add additional complaints against the 
District. 
We affirm the Director's determination that Assante has no 
standing to allege violations of §209-a.l(d) and §209-a.2(b) of 
the Act as we have previously held that an individual employee 
has no standing to allege a violation of the duty to negotiate in 
good faith.-7 
The charge was filed on April 8, 1994. Therefore, only 
actions which occurred on or after December 8, 1993 are within 
the four-month filing period specified by §204.1(a) of the Rules. 
Assante refers to no specific events during that time frame, 
making only generalized statements about her ongoing contacts 
with the District and UFT. Therefore, her charge cannot be 
regarded as timely. 
Finally, any of the remaining allegations in the charge and 
the amendment which might relate to events which occurred within 
the four months preceding the filing of the charge, are not 
-'See, e.g. , Local 100, Transport Workers Union of America, 
27 PERB ^3008 (1994); City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 
22 PERB f3012 (1989). 
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factually supported as required by §204.1(b)(3) of our Rules and 
must be dismissed. 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of 
the Director and dismiss the exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
J.^l^j 
Pau/ine R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Waltear*L. Eisenberg, Membe, 
Eric JLr Schmertz, Member 
2G-11/30/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the Impasse Between 
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT OPERATING 
AUTHORITY, 
-and-
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, LOCAL 1440, 
CASE NOS. TIA94-001; 
M93-260 
CERTIFICATION 
In accordance with the provisions of §209.5(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and based upon an 
investigation into the status of the above entitled impasse 
conducted under §205.15 of the Board's Rules of Procedure 
(Rules), it is hereby certified that a voluntary resolution of 
the contract negotiations between the Staten Island Rapid Transit 
Operating Authority and the United Transportation Union, Local 
1440 cannot be effected. The dispute between the parties is 
accordingly referred to a public arbitration panel designated in 
accordance with the provisions of §209.5(a) of the Act and 
§2 05.18 of the Rules. 
DATED: November 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Ki'nsella, C. A. L'li * hairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J^Schmertz, Member 
3A-11/30/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4088 
DERUYTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Food service helper, bus driver, health aide, 
teacher's aide, cafeteria monitor, guidance 
secretary, study hall aide, cook, teacher 
aide/library, driver, school monitor, teaching 
Certification - C-4088 
assistant, custodian, senior typist, bus 
monitor, cleaner, typist, mechanic and account 
clerk. 
Excluded: Head custodian, head mechanic, cook manager and 
all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^ U J X A T~ ^^A 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
2x 
Ep£< c J. Schmertz, Member 
